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GLOBALIZATION AND HEGEMONY SHIFT: 
ARE STATES MERELY AGENTS OF 
CORPORATE CAPITALISM? 
Upendra D. Acharya* 
Abstract: Since the advent of state sovereignty with the Peace of West-
phalia, powerful Western nations have determined and applied interna-
tional law in a manner that advance their national interests. In short, the 
international legal process has been a mechanism of hegemony, and 
powerful Western nations have been hegemons through this process over 
less-developed countries. Since the 1990s, however, the fall of the Soviet 
Union, the spread of technology, and the advent of multinational corpo-
rations have led to a new order wherein corporate capitalism has become 
a primary force in international law and states mostly serve corporate in-
terests. This new order was seen in action in Libya, where Muammar 
Gaddafi was recently overthrown by rebels who received aid from Western 
organizations, mostly because of Gaddafi’s unreliable history of partner-
ing with Western corporations. 
Introduction 
 We live in neither a modern world nor a post-modern world, but a 
globalized world. Globalization reaches economic, financial, techno-
logical, environmental, social, cultural, political, and health-related is-
sues and events. The construct of globalization, by its nature, embraces 
every element of human life, and therefore has become a sort of jus 
cogens of today’s world.1 
 The process of globalization is not a new phenomenon. It was 
seeded at the time that explorers, merchants, colonizers, and occupiers 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Gonzaga University School of Law. This is an expanded ver-
sion of the presentation delivered at the symposium “Filling Power Vacuums in the New 
Global Legal Order,” conducted by the Boston College Law Review and the Boston College Interna-
tional & Comparative Law Review on October 12, 2012. I would like to thank Professor Frank 
Garcia for the opportunity and for his insights with this Article, as well as the panel members 
and participants for their helpful suggestions. I would like to thank Professor Antony Anghie, 
Professor Gerry Hess, and Attorney Jeannie Young for their insightful suggestions. I would 
also like to thank my research assistants, Sarah Karp and Eric Loefflad, for their valuable 
time, hard work, and insights. 
1 See Stephan Hobe, The Era of Globalisation as a Challenge to International Law, 40 Duq. 
L. Rev. 655, 656 (2001). 
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began advancing their profit projects in different territories for the 
Crowns of Europe, forcing weaker peoples to accept their value systems 
and influence.2 This early process of globalization paved the way for 
today’s corporate capitalism.3 Today, the inverse is true—corporate cap-
italism is the locomotive force of today’s globalized world.4 Corporate 
capitalism has created an invisible and inevitable system comprised of 
two primary elements: market and technology, which have become two 
faces of globalization—a modern Ardhanarishvara Shiva.5 
 Individuals and states celebrate (consciously, subconsciously, or 
unconsciously) the invasion of market and technology, and enthusiasti-
cally adapt themselves to globalization. In this process of celebration 
and adaptation, individuals and states accept the hegemony of corpo-
rate capitalism without even noticing their acquiescence.6 States and 
their people, fully immersed in the corporate capitalist society, have 
accepted the profit motive of corporate capitalism as their political val-
ue system to the exclusion of the values of welfare and social justice that 
were espoused by pre-globalized social democracies.7 The access to 
goods and services made available by globalization made corporate cap-
italism a state of mind and lifestyle that forces us into the realm of mar-
ket and technology while ignoring aspirational, emotional, and spiri-
tual elements of human life.8 As Habermas states, the “lifeworld” is di-
minished by systems—market-driven areas of life wherein the operative 
rationality is money and power.9 This corporate-capitalism-induced, 
                                                                                                                      
2 See Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century 
International Law, 40 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1, 36–37 (1999) (quoting M.F. Lindley, The Acquisi-
tion and Government of Backward Territory in International Law 91 (1926)). 
3 See id. 
4 See Jürgen Habermas, Beyond the Nation State?, 10 Peace Rev. 235, 237 (1998). 
5 Ardhanarisvara is a Hindu god with two half faces—one female, one male—and infinite 
power. Ardhanarisvara, New World Encyclopedia, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/ 
entry/ardhanarisvara (last visited Apr. 7, 2013). 
6 See generally Hobe, supra note 1. 
7 Jost Delbrück, The Changing Role of the State in the Globalising World Economy, in Making 
Transnational Law Work in the Global Economy 56, 57 (Pieter H.F. Bekker et al. 
eds., 2010) (describing the earlier transition from paternalistic monarchies of the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries to mercantilism or state-sponsored economic policies in 
order to effectuate states’ obligations of security and general welfare rather than profit); 
Habermas, supra note 4, at 236 (discussing the Western trend transitioning from welfare-
oriented states to a focus on market-friendly conditions in the 1980s). 
8 See 2 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Lifeworld and 
System 321 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1987) (1981). 
9 Id. at 319; see Hugh Baxter, System and Lifeworld in Habermas’s Theory of Law, 23 Car-
dozo L. Rev. 473, 545–49 (2002) (providing a concise explanation of Habermas’s theory 
of the interaction between law and the “lifeworld”). 
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market-driven globalization has successfully insinuated a globalist epis-
temology consisting of a one-dimensional definition of Western civiliza-
tion and values without reference to any social or cultural pluralism.10 
The bottom line has replaced the empathic human response in the 
Western values hierarchy.11 As some politicians have stated, “corporate 
greed [has] exploded beyond anything that could have been imag-
ined,” thriving in an “ethical vacuum space.”12 
 We face a challenge in determining the role that law and authority 
should play in globalization induced and sponsored by corporate capi-
talism. How can law and authority address the effects of globalization in 
limiting or shaping human imagination, understanding, and expecta-
tions by directing the practices of law and its values toward a healthy 
and peaceful world? Where has humanism been placed in the world of 
corporate capitalism-induced, market-driven globalization? We also face 
the question of whether globalization is a natural process or a process 
manufactured for corporate benefit, since it directly helps promote 
free trade and corporate activities, but does not resolve the issues of 
poverty and hunger worldwide.13 
 To address this question in the context of globalization, law, and 
power, Part I of this Article traces the hegemonic process in the crea-
tion and application of international law. Part II and Part III analyze 
how several states became hegemons and how these hegemonic states 
paved the road for the incubation of corporate capitalism. Part IV ad-
dresses whether these states have transformed their hegemony into 
corporate capitalism. Finally, Part V applies this analysis in a critical ex-
amination of Libya under Gaddafi. 
I. Process of Hegemony: International Law, Power, and 
Deterritorialization 
 Discussions of hegemonic international law posit that interna-
tional law is relatively weak, that it is nothing more than epiphenome-
                                                                                                                      
10 Cf. Robert H. Wade, Questions of Fairness: In Search of a Just International Economic Or-
der, Foreign Aff., Sept.–Oct. 2006, at 136, 141 (reviewing Ethan B. Kapstein, Economic 
Justice in an Unfair World (2006)) (critiquing the neo-liberal idea that all countries, 
regardless of development, should be fully economically open, rather than recognizing a 
variety of optimal degrees of economic openness). 
11 See id. at 136. 
12 Id. (quoting Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve and Paul O’Neill, 
former Secretary of the United States Treasury, respectively) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
13 See Hans Küng, A Global Ethic in an Age of Globalization, 7 Bus. Ethics Q., no. 3, 1997 
at 17, 18. 
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nal, merely a production of normative standards that mirror the inter-
ests of powerful states.14 The hegemonic international law theory also 
posits that hegemons (powerful nations among the many sovereign 
states) define the course of states’ behavior by creating and influencing 
international law to give effect to the hegemons’ interests and condone 
actions that support those interests.15 This Part critically observes he-
gemons’ techniques and methods of consolidating power,16 leading to 
the next Part’s discussion addressing an emerging corporate-centric 
hegemonic international law, a new form of international law con-
trasted to Vagts’s state-centric hegemonic international law.17 
 Because international law is based on the mutual consent of sover-
eign states, each participating state must have common values and in-
terests for international law to be effective.18 Political, cultural, reli-
                                                                                                                      
 
14Cf. Detlev F. Vagts, Editorial Comment, Hegemonic International Law, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 
843, 847 (2001) (“In terms of the formation of customary law, such a power can by its ab-
stention prevent the emerging rule from becoming part of custom.”). 
15 See id. at 844 Vagts’s review of earlier “hegemons” that dominated certain regions 
reminds us that each hegemon “led the way in formulating the international law rules of 
the time,” and that Rome, at least, “define[d] . . . rights and duties of the relationship[s] in 
its own interest.” Id. Vagts cites to treaty agreements of the early Monroe Doctrine era, with 
which the United States retained the right to interpret the law and points out that the 
modern last-in-time rule used in the United States heavily favors domestic laws over inter-
national agreements. Id. at 844, 846–47. Another scholar argues that the UN Security 
Council behaves as a hegemon influenced primarily by the United States, despite its “re-
fusal to give explicit approval to Operation Iraqi Freedom in advance,” and its failure to 
prevent the Coalition invasion of Iraq. José E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 
97 Am. J. Int’l L. 873, 873–74 (2003). Alvarez points to U.S. influence in the activities of 
the Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee, established by Security Council Res-
olution 1373. See id. at 875. This resolution selectively adopted provisions of the Interna-
tional Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, by omitting defer-
ence to international humanitarian law requirements, including the rights of judicial dis-
pute settlement. See id. Alvarez also notes that the operation of the Security Council’s 1267 
Sanctions Committee—through which Council members with “substantial counterterror-
ism expertise and resources” control the procedures of identifying individuals and organi-
zations of alleged terrorists subject to financial sanctions—provides evidence of U.S. influ-
ence. See id. at 874–75. Notably, the Security Council resolution granting immunity from 
International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecution “to personnel from ICC non-States Par-
ties involved in United Nations established or authorized missions” has not been chal-
lenged in any courts, but was not renewed in 2004. See Res. 1422/1487, 2004, Coalition 
for Int’l Crim. Ct., http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=res1422 (last visited Apr. 14, 2013). 
16 See infra text accompanying notes 18–32. The discussion relates to state-centric he-
gemony based on a realist approach to international law and state practices. 
17 See infra text accompanying notes 33–60. 
18 Cf. Benedict Kingsbury, Sovereignty and Inequality, 9 Eur. J. Int’l L. 599, 601, 612 
(1998). Kingsbury asserts that the international system’s traditional emphasis on state sov-
ereignty is often ignorant of and unconcerned with the material inequalities among na-
tions. See id. at 601. As a result, states lacking in political and economic power experience a 
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gious, and economic traditions were naturally varied among states be-
fore the implementation of international law.19 Because of this varia-
tion, the powerful Western states superimposed self-styled Western val-
ues such as democracy, a definitive structure of rule of law, industrial 
development, perception of peace, and eventually capitalism on less-
influential or less-powerful states.20 Western hegemons present these 
values as though they are prerequisites for stability.21 In reality, however, 
formal consent to these values allows (in the creation of international 
law) the hegemon to disrupt existing value structures—an inherently 
destabilizing action—and take advantage of the less-powerful states’ 
resources.22 This process of obtaining consent is so sophisticated that it 
frequently requires engaging lawyers and legal scholars to guide less-
powerful states.23 These scholars typically represent Western education 
and ideologies within the scope of the broader interests of hegemons, 
imposing Western legal traditions on non-Western states.24 
 Despite maintaining consent to superimposed Western norms, in-
ternational law lacks a formal enforcement and compliance authority.25 
Nevertheless, fragmented informal or non-legal authority has been in-
stitutionalized through means controlled by hegemons that can make 
others comply with the norms.26 In this scattered and pseudo-legal 
compliance mechanism, hegemons may comply with international law 
when faced with worldwide pressure and opposition from competing 
                                                                                                                      
corresponding deficit of national sovereignty within the system, while the sovereignty of 
powerful states remains unchallenged and highly influential. See id. at 599–601. 
19 See Anghie, supra note 2, at 34–66 (providing a historical overview of the coloniza-
tion process). 
20 See id. at 2. 
21 See id. at 39. 
22 See id. at 49–51. 
23 See Arnulf Becker Lorca, Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century Histories of Im-
position and Appropriation, 51 Harv. Int’l L.J. 475, 477–78 (2010). 
24 See id. at 479–80. 
25 See Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and Interna-
tional Law, 121 Yale L.J., 252, 255–56 (2011) (“The principal objection made by critics of 
international law is that international law cannot be real law because it cannot matter in the 
way that real law must matter. In particular, they argue that international law cannot matter 
in the way it must to be law because it lacks mechanisms of coercive enforcement.”). 
26 Cf. Andreas Paulus, The War Against Iraq and the Future of International Law: Hegemony 
or Pluralism?, 25 Mich. J. Int’l L. 691, 724–25 (2003) (“Indeed, the United States practices 
a strategic and, at times, tactical use of international law—trying to impose obligations on 
others while remaining unrestricted itself.”). 
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hegemons.27 For non-hegemons, a hint of pressure, economic or oth-
erwise, is sometimes sufficient to force compliance with the regime.28 
 According to Antonio Gramsci: 
[H]egemony presupposes that account be taken of the inter-
ests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is 
to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium 
should be formed—in other words, that the leading group 
[hegemons] should make sacrifices of an economic-corporate 
kind. But . . . such sacrifices and such a compromise cannot 
touch the essential . . . [they] must necessarily be based on the 
decisive function exercised by the leading group in the deci-
sive nucleus of economic activity.29 
B.S. Chimni also noted the current influence of what he terms the 
“transnational capitalist class,” that produces a culture in which “the 
third world counterparts essentially act as ‘transmission belts and filter-
ing devices for the imposition of the transnational agenda.’”30 
                                                                                                                      
27 For example, consider the United States’ somewhat belated response to interna-
tional pressure after it became clear that the United States used torture in interrogations 
related to the War on Terror. See U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Field Manual No. 2-22.3: Hu-
man Intelligence Collector Operations, at 5-21 (2006), available at http://www.loc. 
gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/human-intell-collector-operations.pdf (listing beatings, elec-
tric shock, burns, “waterboarding,” using military working dogs, and mock executions as 
prohibited means of interrogation). Consider also the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger 
agreement of 1997, in which the American aerospace giant Boeing conceded to Airbus on 
the supply exclusivity clause. See Yves Belanger & Laurent Carroué, American Offensive for 
Control of the Skies, Le Monde Diplomatique: English Edition (Sept. 1997), http://monde 
diplo.com/1997/09/boeing. 
28 The clearest example of hegemons coercing non-hegemons to behave in a way that 
conforms to Western values is the conditioning of needed loans on “structural adjustment” 
and austerity-like measures on which the IMF and the World Bank insist. Cf. Thomas S. 
Szayna et al., The Emergence of Peer Competitors: A Framework for Analysis 45–47, 
49–50 (2001) (discussing a theory of hegemonic power and stating that a hegemon’s threat 
of imposing conflict onto another state will greatly influence that state’s behavior); Robert J. 
Peterson, Comment, Political Realism and the Judicial Imposition of International Secondary Sanc-
tions: Possibilities from John Doe v. Unocal and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 5 U. Chi. L. Sch. 
Roundtable 277, 292–94 (1998) (discussing the role of economic sanctions in hegemonic 
stability theory). 
29 Antonio Gramsci, State and Civil Society, in The Political Economy of Law: A Third 
World Reader 198, 198 (Yash Ghai et al. eds., 1987); see Antonio Gramsci, Selections 
from the Prison Notebooks 161 (1971). 
30 B.S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 15 
Eur. J. Int’l L. 1, 4–6 (2004) (quoting William I. Robinson, Globalisation: Nine Theses on 
Our Epoch, Race & Class, Oct. 1996, at 13, 19). 
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 International law, in its creation and application, has been a victim 
of the hegemonic power consolidation process.31 Rather than recogniz-
ing and respecting the common goals and values of a pluralistic world, 
international law deems hegemons’ values those of “true” civilization, 
held in esteem and aspired to by all others at the expense of unique and 
insightful non-Western thought.32 Now in the era of globalization, evolv-
ing hegemonic international law theory warrants questioning whether 
states are really the hegemons in today’s world. In order to address this 
question, it is important to analyze the processes of hegemony in the 
development of international law and to identify when the course of the 
hegemonic process departed from state-centric to corporate-centric he-
gemony. 
II. State-Centric Hegemony: Civilizing the Uncivilized and 
Universalizing the Values of Hegemons 
A. Founding Stage: The Peace of Westphalia 
 The Peace Treaty of Westphalia created the concept of sovereignty, 
which was subsequently used to universalize Western European values 
by rejecting the territorial sovereignty of non-European states.33 It was 
the beginning of Eurocentric international law.34 This fundamental 
                                                                                                                      
 
31 See Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping 
of the International Legal Order, 16 Eur. J. Int’l L. 369, 381–84 (2005) (discussing the weak-
ening of international law through an emphasis on soft law and a return to bilateral state 
relations that are more easily shaped and controlled by hegemonic states). 
32 See Kingsbury, supra note 18, at 622. 
33 See Peace Treaty Between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and 
Their Respective Allies arts. LXXVI, XCII, CI, CXVII, Oct. 24, 1648, available at http:// 
avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp. The treaty is commonly understood to 
signal the emergence of international law based on the principle of sovereignty. See Peace of 
Westphalia, New World Encyclopedia, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/ 
Peace_of_Westphalia (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). It gave birth to the principles of equality 
and peace among nation-states of the European continent. See id. It ended the Thirty 
Years’ War and created a diplomatic way of dealing among European nations. See id. It was 
a compromise among emperors and churches based on geographic reality and the inter-
ests of conflicting powers at the time. See id. This concept of sovereignty helped form what 
is now also known as Eurocentric international law. See Kingsbury, supra note 18, at 606. 
The idea that the concept of sovereignty originated at Westphalia is debated among schol-
ars, but the common understanding that sovereignty began there has had a tremendous 
impact on the international legal tradition, which is most important for our purposes. See 
John Hilla, The Literary Effect of Sovereignty in International Law, 14 Widener L. Rev. 77, 111–
15 (2008) (discussing the origins of sovereignty). 
34 Cf. Turan Kayaoglu, Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory, 12 Int’l 
Stud. Rev. 193, 199 (2010) (“The jurists’ construction of ‘Westphalian’ international soci-
ety was part of the larger intellectual trend of nineteenth century, European exceptional-
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concept of international law, that all states are equally sovereign, did 
not apply to those peoples and societies who were most profoundly af-
fected by it.35 On one hand, it was a law that allowed Europe to proceed 
in peace.36 On the other hand, it enabled powerful European nations 
to suppress non-Western peoples and conquer their land by force, de-
nying legal personality to territories that certainly would have benefit-
ted from a right to sovereignty.37 For example, European jurists inter-
preted in their own terms the legal status of non-Europeans, and de-
termined when it was legal for the Spanish to go to war against Indians 
and the rules of conducting war.38 Even Grotius, the father of modern 
international law, justified the Dutch East India Company’s expansion 
in the East Indies, against the interests of Portugal.39 In this way, jurists 
and European nations ignored the notion of sovereign equality and 
endorsed the hegemonic process of creating and applying interna-
tional law at international law’s very foundational phase.40 
B. The Congress of Vienna and Subsequent Conquest and Expansion 
 Another notable mark in the development of the Western domi-
nance in international law was the Congress of Vienna.41 The Congress 
                                                                                                                      
 
ism. According to this perspective, European societies and political systems were superior 
to the European past and to the rest of the world.”). 
35 Cf. id. at 202 (“With respect to the non-Western world, this argument meant that non-
Western societies did not have any place in ‘Westphalian’ international law, because these 
societies were not signatories to the treaties and conventions that made international law.”). 
36 Sir Walter George Frank Phillimore, Three Centuries of Treaties of Peace 
and Their Teaching 19 (1918). 
37 Lorca, supra note 23, at 477. 
38 Antony Anghie, The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities, 
27 Third World Q. 739, 743–44 (2006). 
39 Antony Anghie, The Grotius Lecture: ASIL 2010: International Law in a Time of Change: 
Should International Law Lead or Follow?, 26 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1315, 1319–21 (2011); see 
Peter Borschberg, Hugo Grotius, East India Trade and the King of Johor, 30 J. Southeast 
Asian Stud. 225, 231–32 (1999). 
40 See Anghie, supra note 39, at 1319, 1321–22; Borschberg, supra note 39, at 231–32; 
Kayaoglu, supra note 34, at 195–96. 
41 See Phillimore, supra note 36, at 25; Genevieve Peterson, Political Inequality at the Con-
gress of Vienna, 60 Pol. Sci. Q. 532, 533 (1945). The Congress of Vienna was an assembly in 
1814–15 convened to settle boundaries peacefully by employing a balance-of-power strategy 
against any potential unilateral power that could destabilize Western Europe. See Congress of 
Vienna, Brittanica Academic Edition, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/ 
628086/Congress-of-Vienna (last visited Apr. 18, 2013); Diplomacy: The Concert of Europe to the 
Outbreak of World War I, Brittanica Academic Edition, http://www.britannica.com/EB 
checked/topic/164602/diplomacy/233745/The-Concert-of-Europe-to-the-outbreak-of-World- 
War-I?anchor=ref83071 (last visited Apr. 18, 2013). Although the Congress of Vienna success-
fully reestablished stability in Europe, it led to competition among its participants for colonies 
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came after 150 years of European exploration, and European powers 
were not inclined to extend sovereignty to the peoples of these “discov-
ered” lands.42 Colonizing powers imposed their laws to deny sovereign 
status to the peoples of Asia and Africa.43 The full effect of denying sov-
ereignty was clear after the Berlin Conference of 1885, during which 
European powers divided up Africa among themselves without consult-
ing the continent’s inhabitants.44 This colonialism gave Western inter-
national law universal reach by the late nineteenth century.45 This uni-
versalized Western international law justified the conquest and dispos-
session of non-European peoples.46 
                                                                                                                     
C. The League of Nations, United Nations, and More Equal  
Governmental Sovereignty 
 In a watershed agreement introducing an international organiza-
tion as a new actor in international law, the Treaty of Versailles created 
 
in Asia and Africa; this colonization process involved fighting savage wars against the people of 
Asia and Africa. Cf. Anghie, supra note 2, at 1–2 (noting that, by the early twentieth century 
and after many colonial conflicts, European nations controlled almost all the territories of Asia 
and Africa). 
42 See Phillimore, supra note 36, at 35. 
43 See Anghie, supra note 2, at 2 (“By 1914, after numerous colonial wars, virtually all 
the territories of Asia, Africa, and the Pacific were controlled by the major European 
states, resulting in the assimilation of all these non-European peoples into a system of law 
that was fundamentally European in that it derived from European thought and experi-
ence.”). 
44 See id. at 1–2 (“The universalization of international law was principally a consequence 
of the imperial expansion that took place towards the end of the ‘long nineteenth cen-
tury.’”); cf. Abednego E. Ekoko, Sixth Inaugural Lecture at Delta State University, Abraka: 
Boundaries and National Security (Mar. 25, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.nuc. 
edu.ng/nucsite/File/ILS%202004/ILS-129.pdf) (“The emergence of internal boundaries in 
Nigeria was the function of the administrative ingenuity, opportunism, exigency, ignorance, 
ineptitude and convenience of the British colonising authority between 1900 and 1960.”). 
45 See Anghie, supra note 38, at 736. 
46 See id. at 745. The justification for conquest was to civilize the uncivilized. See id. at 
742. So-called uncivilized nations lacked legal personality to make claims against colonial 
powers to participate in international lawmaking. Id. at 745. Colonizing powers utilized 
their national corporations as a trade tool to strengthen their hegemonic muscles. Cf. id. at 
748 (stating that less-powerful nations pursued economic independence after decoloniza-
tion by nationalizing “foreign entities that had [previously] acquired rights over” those 
nations’ natural resources). Further, legal positivism simultaneously supplied an intellec-
tual and jurisprudential basis for doing so by arguing that non-European states were un-
civilized, and therefore lacked sovereignty and legal personality to use international law 
against European powers. See id. at 745; Ruth Gordon, Critical Race Theory and International 
Law: Convergence and Divergence Racing American Foreign Policy, 94 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 
260, 263 (2000). 
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the League of Nations.47 Though the League was hailed as an innova-
tion with the potential to bring lasting peace to the world under the 
guidance of Western Europe and the United States, the League also 
created the mandate system, which has been criticized for advancing 
the idea of moral colonialism.48 
 After the Second World War, the Charter of the United Nations 
(UN) was adopted.49 This development celebrates a unique compro-
mise between the contemporaneously existing hegemons and other 
less-powerful states.50 Under the UN system, newly decolonized and 
independent states made efforts to resist the hegemon states’ colonial 
practices by adopting a series of General Assembly resolutions, includ-
ing the resolution regarding Inadmissibility of the Policy of Hegemonism.51 
Those resolutions, however, lacked effect due to opposition from the 
hegemonic states.52 Meanwhile, international financial institutions such 
                                                                                                                      
 
47 See Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 
18 Mich. J. Int’l L. 183, 213–14 (1997). 
48 Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Econ-
omy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 513, 526 
(2002). 
49 The representatives of fifty countries met in San Francisco in 1945 at the UN Con-
ference on International Organization and drafted the UN Charter. History of the United 
Nations, http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2013). Those rep-
resentatives signed the Charter on June 26, 1945, and the UN officially came into being on 
October 24, 1945. See id. 
50 An example of such compromise is the adoption of the concept of sovereign equality 
as a foundational principle of the Charter on the one hand, and creation of the permanent 
members of the Security Council and their veto power on the other. Compare U.N. Charter 
art. 2, para. 5 (“The organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
members.”), with U.N. Charter art. 23 para. 1, art. 27, para. 3 (creating the Security Council 
and its voting rules). This compromise produced a concept of legal inequality in the system 
of international rule of law under the Charter. For other compromises between hegemons 
and non-hegemons, see Paul W. Kahn, Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human 
Rights, and the New International Order, 1 Chi. J. Int’l L. 1, 2 (2000); Krisch, supra note 31, at 
405–06. 
51 See Inadmissibility of the Policy of Hegemonism in International Relations, G.A. Res. 
34/103, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/103 (Dec. 14, 1979); see also Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 29/3281 (XXIX), art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281, (Dec. 12, 
1974) (“Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including pos-
session, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and economic activities.”); 
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-
VI), ¶ 4(e), U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-6/3201 (May 1, 1974) (“The new international economic 
order shall be founded on . . . [f]ull permanent sovereignty of every State over its natural 
resources and all economic activities.”); G.A. Res. 3171 (XXVIII), ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/3171 (Dec. 17, 1973); G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962). 
52 General Assembly Resolution 1803 of December 14, 1962 passed by eighty-seven votes 
to two, with twelve abstentions. Gregory J. Kerwin, Note, The Role of United Nations General 
Assembly Resolutions in Determining Principles of International Law in United States Courts, 1983 
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as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, domi-
nated by Western influence, expanded privatization of the third world’s 
resources, hindering newly independent states’ ability to exercise the 
sovereignty they had finally achieved.53 
                                                                                                                      
Duke L.J. 876, 883 n.37. Resolution 3171 passed by 108 votes to one, with sixteen abstentions; 
however, Paragraph 3 of the Resolution, stating that each state has the right to determine the 
amount of possible compensation for resource nationalization and the means of payment, 
was adopted by eighty-six votes to eleven, with twenty-eight abstentions. Id. Resolution 3281 
was adopted by 118 votes to six, with ten abstentions. Id. Both Resolutions 3171 and 3281 
were subject to roll-call votes on the compensation and nationalization sections, and all of the 
industrialized countries either voted against these provisions or abstained. See Texaco Over-
seas Petroleum Co. v. Libya, 17 I.L.M. 1, ¶¶ 84–85 (1978) (recognizing that the opposition 
and abstention of a few industrialized nations created no general consensus and therefore 
does not refer to international law); Kerwin, supra, at 883 n.37. 
53 The World Bank’s purposes include alleviating poverty and fulfilling such basic 
needs as clean water, education, healthcare, housing, and environmental protection. Ibra-
him F.I. Shihata, The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of the Legal Issues and the 
Record of Achievements, 17 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 39, 40 (1988). It also provides subsi-
dized loans (known as “credits”), technical assistance, and policy advice to the least-
developed states, some of whom are unable to attract the attention of, or obtain favorable 
borrowing terms from, the international financial markets. See id. at 40. Indeed, the World 
Bank is “one of the world’s largest sources of funding for the developing world.” Press 
Release, The World Bank, The World Bank, in P’ship with WWF and IUCN, Are Imple-
menting the EU Funded Program To Improve Forest Law Enforcement and Governance 
in the ENPI East Countries and Russ. ( July 14, 2010), http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/ 
press-release/2010/07/14/world-bank-partnership-wwf-iucn-implementing-eu-funded-pro- 
gram-improve-forest-law-enforcement-governance-enpi-east-countries-russia. The Interna-
tional Finance Corporation, a division of the World Bank Group, “provides debt and equity 
financing for private enterprises in developing countries.” Ann M. Scarlett, Imitation or 
Improvement? The Evolution of Shareholder Derivative Litigation in the United States, United King-
dom, Canada, and Australia, 28 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 569, 570 (2011). The Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency “insures private investors against noncommercial risks in 
politically volatile environments,” while the International Centre for Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes (ICSID) “settles investment disputes between private investors and their 
host states,” compromising the sovereignty interests of developing countries in favor of 
private investment sectors. See Emeka Duruigbo, The World Bank, Multinational Oil Corpora-
tions, and the Resource Curse in Africa, 26 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 1, 27 (2005). The World 
Bank Group has been involved for a considerable period of time in oil, gas, and mining 
projects in different parts of the world. See Heather Turcotte, Slippery Security: National, 
International and Global Security Issues Within Petroleum Production, Alternatives: Turk. J. 
Int’l Rel., Winter 2002, at 109, 130. Since 1992, the Bank has approved $18.5 billion for 
oil, gas, and coal projects in twenty-five developing countries, including Bolivia, Brazil, 
Bosnia, Guatemala, Russia, and Trinidad and Tobago. See id. at 130, 133 (detailing the 
extent of the World Bank’s involvement in funding for oil production). 
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D. Globalization as a Precursor to Hegemony Shift 
 The twenty-first century reached a new threshold in the develop-
ment of international law—the war on terror.54 It is again up to the he-
gemon states to determine what constitutes terrorism and what meth-
ods to apply to suppress terrorism.55 
 From international law’s advent at Westphalia, it has suffered from 
the hegemonic process in its development and application.56 Interna-
tional law, as a product of hegemonic process of powerful Western 
states, has globalized the values of Western hegemons as a necessary 
legal condition for the world order and has shaped a worldview.57 
 Nevertheless, there has been a remarkable shift in the develop-
ment of international law since 1990.58 Until 1990, powerful states used 
international financial institutions and their national corporations to 
expand the idea of capitalism as a political ideology against the compet-
ing Soviet model of socialism.59 In the post-1990 globalized world, cor-
porations and states have partnered to promote the hegemon’s influ-
                                                                                                                      
54 See Upendra D. Acharya, War on Terror or Terror Wars: The Problem in Defining Terrorism, 
37 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 653, 671 (2009); Noman Goheer, The Unilateral Creation of 
International Law During the “War on Terror”: Murder by an Unprivileged Belligerent Is Not a War 
Crime, 10 N.Y. City L. Rev. 533, 560 (2007); Ikechi Mgbeoji, The Bearded Bandit, the Outlaw 
Cop, and the Naked Emperor: Towards a North-South (De)Construction of the Texts and Contexts of 
International Law’s (Dis)Engagement with Terrorism, 43 Osgoode Hall L.J. 105, 132 (2005); 
Ved P. Nanda, International Law Implications of the United States’ “War on Terror,” 37 Denv. J. 
Int’l L. & Pol’y 513, 521–22 (2009); Sami Zeidan, Agreeing to Disagree: Cultural Relativism 
and the Difficulty of Defining Terrorism in a Post-9/11 World, 29 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 215, 216 (2006); Sami Zeidan, Desperately Seeking Definition: The International Commu-
nity’s Quest for Identifying the Specter of Terrorism, 36 Cornell Int’l L.J. 491, 491 (2004). 
55 See Goheer, supra note 54, at 543 (noting that the U.S. government defined who 
would be classified as a terrorist after September 11, 2001). 
56 See Renê Guilherme S. Medrado, Renegotiating Remedies in the WTO: A Multilateral Ap-
proach, 22 Wis. Int’l L.J. 323, 327 n.13 (2004) (“[T]he Treaty of Westphalia is seen as the 
event marking the advent of the traditional international law . . . .”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); Vagts, supra note 14, at 843 (examining the history and legal implications 
of hegemonic international law); supra text accompanying notes 33–53. 
57 See Anghie, supra note 2, at 39. 
58 See Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 Minn. L. 
Rev. 815, 838–39 (2009) (“In the early 1990s, on the heels of the Cold War, a great enthu-
siasm for international law and institutions existed. But by the mid-1990s, this optimism 
subsided.”); W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment, International Law After the Cold War, 
84 Am. J. Int’l L. 859, 866 (“The international political system is at the threshold of a time 
of hope. The ending of the Cold War is a major achievement, but we are not about to en-
ter the millennium. . . . The need for international law after the Cold War will be more 
urgent than it was during the conflict. In many ways, what is expected of international law 
will be greater.”). 
59 Anne Boschini & Anders Olofsgård, Foreign Aid: An Instrument for Fighting Commu-
nism?, 43 J. Dev. Stud. 622, 622–23 (2007). 
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ence and market access until corporations attained or even exceeded 
the power wielded by their native states.60 
III. Incubating Corporate Capitalism: A Transition to 
Hegemony Shift 
A. Non-Hegemon States’ Battle for New Economic Order 
 International law generally functions in a decentralized and hori-
zontal system of law and order, where hegemonic states create interna-
tional law to maximize their self-interests at the cost of global good and 
the true value of the rule of law.61 Further, international institutions are 
generally used by hegemon states to facilitate their interests.62 Hege-
monic states have used international law and institutions to maximize 
their economic interests by providing and advocating for the protection 
of foreign investments made by their national corporations.63 Global-
                                                                                                                      
60 See Samuel P. Huntington, Transnational Organizations in World Politics, 25 World 
Pol. 333, 335–36 (1973). 
61 See Neomi Rao, Public Choice and International Law Compliance: The Executive Branch Is 
a “They,” Not an “It,” 96 Minn. L. Rev. 194, 212 (2011) (“In recent years, scholars have chal-
lenged the model of unitary states acting within the international system and proposed 
instead a liberal account of international relations that disaggregates the state. . . . State 
preferences represent subsets of domestic society and powerful interest groups, and the 
configuration of state preferences determines state behavior in international relations.”); 
Michael P. Scharf, International Law in Crisis: A Qualitative Empirical Contribution to the Com-
pliance Debate, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 45, 54 (2009) (examining different theories of interna-
tional law that emerged after the 1990s). 
62 William J. Aceves, The Economic Analysis of International Law: Transaction Cost Econom-
ics and the Concept of State Practice, 17 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 995, 1064 (1996); Robert D. 
Cooter, Structural Adjudication in the New Law Merchant: A Model Decentralized Law, 14 Int’l 
Rev. L. & Econ. 215, 215–16 (1994). 
63 See Burton I. Kaufman, Mideast Multinational Oil, U.S. Foreign Policy, and Antitrust: The 
1950s, 63 J. Am. Hist. 937, 938–39 (1977). The U.S. government expressly relaxed antitrust 
regulations for American-based transnational oil and gas companies so that they could be 
used in the vulnerable Middle East “for foreign policy purposes.” See id. at 938, 940. The 
Truman administration dropped criminal charges for antitrust violations and granted im-
munities to those laws. Id. at 938. Additionally, 1918’s Webb-Promerene Act exempted “busi-
ness combinations engaged in export trade from the provisions of the antitrust laws.” Id. at 
940. Nonetheless, companies rarely took advantage of this law. See id.; see also Chimni, supra 
note 30, at 20 (describing Western dominance in the World Trade Organization (WTO)); 
Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 Harv. Int’l L.J. 67, 76 (2005) (stating that the 
United States has actively encouraged investment and market liberalization with host coun-
tries to facilitate the entry and operation of investments, and has actively protected private 
investments by U.S. nationals through aggressive negotiation of bilateral investment treaties); 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, Off. U.S. Trade Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties (last visited Apr. 21, 2013). 
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ization has become a shibboleth under which corporations export their 
values through the legal institutions that protect corporate interests.64 
 During the pre-globalized era, capital export from hegemon states 
to non-hegemon states or former colonies for the purpose of extracting 
natural resources was routine.65 In addition to capital, legal concepts 
and values such as private property, contract guarantee, privatization, 
and market-based economic growth were also exported, making them 
inevitable conditions for modern civilization under corporate capital-
ism.66 These ideas and values formed the framework required by inter-
national trade and investment for relations between hegemons, business 
entities of hegemon nations, and the non-hegemon nations.67 Interna-
tional financial institutions’ involvement ensured that neo-liberal eco-
nomic, political, and legal infrastructures were implemented to give way 
to the capital export in the name of the economic development of non-
hegemons.68 In this mission, newly decolonized countries’ rights to 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources were weakened.69 The 
                                                                                                                      
64 See Michael Parenti, Against Empire 21–22 (1995). 
65 See Cheryl W. Gray & William W. Jarosz, Law and the Regulation of Foreign Direct In-
vestment: The Experience from Central and Eastern Europe, 33 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 1, 9 
(1995) (“If states are free to trade, and goods require differing amounts of two stylized 
factors, capital or labor, patterns will develop in which countries rich in capital, export 
capital intensive goods, and countries rich in labor, export labor intensive goods.”); Joel R. 
Paul, Do International Trade Institutions Contribute to Economic Growth and Development?, 44 Va. 
J. Int’l L. 285, 305 (2003) (“In conditions of free trade, a country that had an abundance 
of capital would export capital-intensive goods, whereas a country with an abundance of 
labor would export labor-intensive goods.”). 
66 See David Harvey, The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism 48–49 
(2010). Capitalism can only be sustained through perpetual reinvestment of surplus into 
new sources of capital. See id. at 45. Harvey notes that “[b]oth legal as well illegal means . . . 
are deployed [to assemble capital]. The legal means include privatisation of what were 
once considered common property resources (like water and education), the use of the 
power of eminent domain to seize assets, widespread practices of takeovers, mergers, and 
the like . . . .” Id. at 49. 
67 See Parenti, supra note 64, at 35 (“Designed to leave the world’s economic destiny to 
. . . bankers and multinational corporations, globalization is a logical extension of imperi-
alism, a victory of empire over republic, international finance capital over democracy.”); 
see also Int’l Labor Rights Fund, The World Bank and IMF Policies in Cote d’Ivoire: 
Impact on Child Labor in the Cocoa Industry 1–2 (2004), available at http://www. 
laborrights.org/stop-child-labor/cocoa-campaign/resources/10651. 
68 See John Williamson, A Short History of the Washington Consensus, 15 L. & Bus. Rev. 
Am. 7, 9–10 (2009) (reflecting on the use of the ten-point plan Williamson published twen-
ty years prior that eventually became the Washington Consensus); see also Enrique R. Car-
rasco, An Opening for Voice in the Global Economic Order: The Global Financial Crisis and Emerg-
ing Economies, 12 Or. Rev. Int’l L. 179, 189–94 (2010) (discussing the rise of “structural 
adjustment” programs as preconditions to IMF lending and the perceived need for “uni-
versality” despite the outcry from heavily indebted third-world states). 
69 See Kaufman, supra note 63, at 939–40. 
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hegemonic states did not hesitate to use force or aggression to protect 
their economic or investment interests.70 Decolonized nations tried to 
block the use of force in this context.71 The Drago Doctrine72 and the 
Calvo Clause73 are examples of such resistance against hegemonic force. 
 The developing countries felt that the rule of colonial power failed 
to advance their societies economically due to the peripheral positions 
they had in the international economy.74 The non-hegemonic states 
suggested the New International Economic Order (NIEO) as an alter-
native economic system suitable to their needs.75 The NIEO challenged 
unfair international trading, investment, and finance rules and favored 
the right to development.76 Nevertheless, hegemonic states successfully 
advocated not only the rule of succession, but also the rule of custom-
ary international law to bind non-hegemons to treaties signed by or 
under their colonizers.77 The defeat of the NIEO and similar theories 
                                                                                                                      
 
70 See David Graeber, Debt: The First 5,000 Years 349–50 (2011) (noting that, be-
tween 1909 and 1912, tens of thousands of Huitoto Indians in Peru were massacred for 
their refusal to enter into commercial relations with agents representing a British rubber 
company subsidiary). 
71 See Bernardo M. Cremades, Disputes Arising out of Foreign Direct Investment in Latin 
America: A New Look at the Calvo Doctrine and Other Jurisdictional Issues, 59 Disp. Resol. J. 78, 
80 (2004). 
72 See Claudio Grossman, Latin American Contributions to International Law, 94 Am. Soc’y 
Int’l L. Proc. 45, 45 (2000). The Drago Doctrine held that international law did not au-
thorize European powers to use armed intervention to force American republics to pay 
public debts. See id. The Doctrine was asserted by Argentine Foreign Affairs Minister Luis 
María Drago on December 29, 1902. See Amos S. Hershey, The Calvo and Drago Doctrines, 1 
Am. J. Int’l L. 26, 28–30 (1907). 
73 See Grossman, supra note 72, at 45. The Calvo Doctrine also suggests that an armed 
intervention or diplomatic interventions are not authorized to collect public debts. Id. 
Nations must go to court to resolve debt disputes. Id. 
74 See G.A. Res. 3201, supra note 51, ¶ 4(e); Upendra D. Acharya, Is Development a Lost 
Paradise? Trade, Development and Environment: A Triadic Dream of International Law, 45 Alta. 
L. Rev. 401, 404 n.9 (2007) (“The initiative for the NIEO was launched in 1973 at the Con-
ference of Non-Aligned Countries held in Algiers. This economic order was proposed by 
the developing countries during the Non-Aligned Movement conference as a first com-
prehensive vision of world problems and their economic solutions. Later in 1974, the UN 
General Assembly adopted the resolution on the establishment of [the] NIEO. The resolu-
tion is based on the recognition of the inequalities among countries in the North and the 
South; it reiterates the sovereignty of the states over their natural resources and economic 
activities and enumerates a set of demands of developing countries in the areas of interna-
tional trade, financial assistance, monetary reforms, technology transfer, etc., while de-
nouncing colonialism, neo-colonialism, and other forms of oppression faced by develop-
ing countries.”). 
75 See Acharya, supra note 74, at 404. 
76 See id. 
77 These norms are practiced for a long period of time and the old treaties must be 
observed under the principle of pacta sunt servanda; as such, customary international law 
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cemented the hegemons’ law as universal with regard to trade and de-
velopment.78 The hegemonic states’ use of rules to promote their trade 
and investment reflect the Hull doctrine to protect the trade interests 
of the hegemons.79 Now the concept of the right to development has 
been replaced by or prioritized through international trade and in-
vestment mechanisms.80 
B. Investment Treaties and Trade Bodies as Modern Hegemonic Processes 
 Customary international law has been employed and interpreted in 
favor of hegemonic states.81 The treaties establishing the International 
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)82 have been 
branded “bills of rights for foreign investors”83 as part of an interna-
tional legal framework that forces non-hegemon sovereign states to be 
                                                                                                                      
that has been in existence for a long time cannot be challenged by newly independent 
states. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331; Catherine Logan Piper, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: The Goal of Universality, 71 
Iowa L. Rev. 295, 307–08 (1985). Although the new independent countries advocated a 
notion that they should be able to select only those treaty commitments that best suited 
them and objected the old international legal regime as a part of their right to self-
determination (Nyerere Doctrine), the old regime prevailed. See Valerie Knobelsdorf, 
Note, The Nile Waters Agreements: Imposition and Impacts of a Transboundary Legal System, 44 
Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 622, 632–34 (2006) (describing the Nyerere doctrine). 
78 See Barbara Stark, Theories of Poverty/The Poverty of Theory, 2009 BYU L. Rev. 381, 421–
23. 
79 See Tali Levy, Note, NAFTA’s Provision for Compensation in the Event of Expropriation: A 
Reassessment of the “Prompt, Adequate, and Effective” Standard, 31 Stan. J. Int’l L. 423, 425–26 
(1995) (describing the Hull Doctrine and its lasting impact on the United States’ trade 
agreements). 
80 Acharya, supra note 74, at 405. 
81 See Vagts, supra note 14, at 847 (discussing how one powerful state’s abstention from 
a customary norm can prevent the norm from having the force of customary international 
law); see also Julien Cantegreil, The Audacity of the Texaco/Calasiatic Award: René-Jean Dupuy 
and the Internationalization of Foreign Investment Law, 22 Eur. J. Int’l L. 441, 455–58 (2011) 
(critiquing Professor Dupuy’s interpretation of customary international law from the point 
of view of an arbitrator determining compensation for nationalized property). 
82 The ICSID is a forum created through a multilateral treaty formulated by the Ex-
ecutive Directors of the World Bank. See About ICSID, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ 
ICSID/ICSID/AboutICSID_Home.jsp (last visited Apr. 22, 2013). It offers arbitration ser-
vices to consenting parties with the goal of “remov[ing] major impediments to the free 
international flows of private investment posed by non-commercial risks and the absence 
of specialized international methods for investment dispute settlement.” Id. 
83 James Thuo Gathii, War, Commerce, and International Law 166 (2010) (quot-
ing Jose E. Alvarez, Critical Theory and the North American Free Trade Agreement’s Chapter Elev-
en, 28 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 303, 308 (1996)); see Susan D. Franck, The Nature and 
Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment Treaties: Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright 
Future, 12 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 47, 48 (2005). 
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accountable to corporations.84 American Manufacturing & Trading, Inc. v. 
Republic of Zaire 85 and Wena Hotels Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt 86 are 
two ICSID arbitrations where states were made responsible for compen-
sating the capital exporting corporations for losses, even though there 
were out-of-control security situations involved. In addition to the IC-
SID, the escape clause87 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) strengthened hegemonic states’ power to discriminate against 
less-powerful states.88 Also, the World Bank and the IMF are constantly 
promoting the idea of privatization in order to accommodate corporate 
                                                                                                                      
84 See Richard Peet & Elaine Hartwick, Theories of Development 63 (1999). 
A single developmental model, export-oriented manufacturing within an 
open, market economy, achieves a position of such dominance that alterna-
tive forms of development are dismissed as irrelevant, even by supposedly left-
ist governments like the Mandela administration in postapartheid South Af-
rica . . . . IMF-imposed structural adjustment programs, designed to produce 
the social and economic conditions for export-oriented growth, are continu-
ally resisted by masses of starving people. 
Id. 
85 See Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, 
Award, ¶ 7.16 (Feb. 21, 1997), 36 I.L.M. 1534 (1997). The ICSID determined Zaire was 
obligated to compensate American Manufacturing and Trading Company (AMT) for loss 
caused by its armed forces, even though Zaire invested in AMT through SINZA, a local 
Zairian company. See id. ¶¶ 3.13, 5.15–.16. 
86 Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award, 
¶ 131 (Dec. 8, 2000), 41 I.L.M. 896 (2002). In Wena Hotels, both the original arbitral tribu-
nal and the ad hoc annulment committee failed to respect the ICSID Convention’s Article 
48 requirement to state the reasons upon which an investor-state arbitration award is 
based. See id. 
87 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XIX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. Article XIX of GATT provides that if any product is 
being imported by a member nation in “such increased quantities and under such condi-
tions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers . . . of like or directly 
competitive products,” the country concerned can “suspend the obligation” or “withdraw 
or modify the concession” with respect to that product for such time or to such extent as 
necessary to prevent or remedy the injury. Id. Typically GATT refers to Article XIX as an 
escape clause, but there are other ways countries can escape their obligations under Arti-
cles XXVII (permanent protection), XII or XXVIII (balance of payments problem), XX or 
XXI (national security or other general security problems), and XXV (granting of waiv-
ers). See id. arts. XII, XXV, XXVII–XXVIII. 
88 It appeared that the GATT rules treated all member nations equally under the Most 
Favored Nation and NTO clauses, however the poor and less-powerful countries could not 
stand equally with the hegemon states for the purpose of trade retaliation. See C. O’Neal 
Taylor, Impossible Cases: Lessons from the First Decade of WTO Dispute Settlement, 28 U. Pa. J. 
Int’l Econ. L. 309, 446 (2007) (“There is a problem of less compliance by the major states 
and the reality of differential compliance: the major powers are in a position to refuse to 
comply while the smaller/less powerful cannot.”). 
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activities.89 Among these laws and institutional functions, transnational 
corporations emerged as a main engine of the globalizing economy.90 
IV. Hegemony Shift: The Rise of Corporate Capitalism 
 Until 1990, the hegemonic states used corporations as their trad-
ing and economic tools to foster capitalism as a political ideology 
against the Soviet Union’s competing communist political ideology.91 
Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formal con-
clusion of the Cold War, the IMF predicted a utopia where, at the end 
of the twentieth century, the new world order would be governed by 
liberal democratic views that would bring about a global economy 
based on free-market ideals.92 This prediction was supported by Francis 
Fukuyama, who wrote that the liberalized Western view would remain 
the monopolistic concept sustaining the world order, and ideological 
threats to this world order would be over.93 Unfortunately, during this 
globalized era, the world is witnessing not only the struggle of Western 
hegemonic states to maintain their unilateral decisive actions, either in 
the course of the war on terror,94 or trade war,95 but also the emer-
gence of quasi-hegemon states96 (newly emerged economically power-
ful states) and multinational corporations as super hegemons.97 The 
                                                                                                                      
 
89 See generally Peet & Hartwick, supra note 84. 
90 See Luz Estella Nagle, Selling Souls: The Effect of Globalization on Human Trafficking and 
Forced Servitude, 26 Wis. Int’l L.J. 131, 152–53 (2008). 
91 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
92 Upendra D. Acharya, Humanitarian Aid and Assistance to Constrain Piracy in Soma-
lia: Ignored Facts and the Political Delivery of Charity 3 (Aug. 20, 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2139198. 
93 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man 211 (1992). 
94 Difficulties faced by the United States and its allies in Iraq and Afghanistan have led 
some to question whether a victory can be claimed in the war on terror. See, e.g., Philip H. 
Gordon, Can the War on Terror Be Won? How to Fight the Right War, Foreign Aff., Nov.–Dec. 
2007, at 53; Mary L. Dudziak, This War Is Not over Yet, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 2012, at A31. The 
recent attack on the U.S. embassy in Benghazi, Libya has shown the world that acts of ter-
rorism persist. See Nat’l Counterterrorism Ctr., Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, U.S. Dep’t 
St. (July 31, 2012), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195555.htm. 
95 As China ascends to the level of a global economic hegemon, trade disputes with es-
tablished powers, especially the United States, will likely increase in number and intensity. 
See Kara Loridas, United States-China Trade War: Signs of Protectionism in a Globalized Economy?, 
34 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 403, 413–14 (2011). 
96 David P. Fidler, Eastphalia Emerging?: Asia, International Law, and Global Governance, 17 
Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 1, 7 (2010) (considering China and India as possible new 
contenders as the most influential states in global policy). 
97 See Sheldon S. Wolin, Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the 
Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism 136 (2008) (“An important fact of contemporary 
politics is that, while the scope of government regulatory authority has receded, corporate 
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globalization of economic interests of corporate capitalism through 
financial and technological transactions and expansion has dictated 
international law and its interpretation,98 domestic policy agendas,99 
and the socio-cultural values of the entire world.100 
                                                                                                                     
 Before globalization, states had varying degrees of control (de-
pending upon their position in the power structure) over the gravity of 
their authority with regard to international law and its application. They 
accordingly implemented domestic policy based on the original values 
of democracy: that the state and the system of governance are for the 
people, and that businesses and corporations are mere economic con-
veniences for each individual’s pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness.101 
However, the emergence of corporate capitalism in today’s globalized 
context has foreclosed such humanitarian policymaking priority. 
A. States: Conduits for Corporate Capitalism 
 Corporate capitalism is propagated by two actors in the age of 
globalization—transnational conglomerates (primary actors) and states 
(secondary actors).102 Corporate boards lead trade negotiations as ex-
 
 
power has increasingly assumed governmental functions and services, many of which had 
previously been deemed the special preserve of state power. . . . To the extent that corpo-
ration and state are now indissolubly connected, ‘privatization’ becomes normal and state 
action in defiance of corporate wishes the aberration.”); Joel Slawotsky, The Global Corpora-
tion as International Law Actor, 52 Va. J. Int’l L. Dig. 79, 80 (2012) (arguing that large mul-
tinational corporations should be treated similarly to states in the application of interna-
tional law because of their comparable reach, power, and asset control). 
98 See supra text accompanying notes 61–80 (discussing the concept of sovereignty and the 
defeat of the NIEO); see also Office of the U.S. Trade Representative & U.S. Dep’t of State, 
2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, pmbl., http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/ 
files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf. 
99 See Wolin, supra note 97, at 136 (“The strategy followed by privatization’s advocates is, 
first, to discredit welfare functions as ‘socialism’ and then either to sell those functions to a 
private bidder or to privatize a particular program.”); Thomas B. Edsall, Lobbyists’ Emergence 
Reflects Shift in Capital Culture, Wash. Post, Jan. 12, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/11/AR2006011102318.html (describing the thriving lob-
bying industry in American politics). 
100 See Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man 3–5 (1964). 
101 See Chari Alson Maddren, AIDS Vaccines: Balancing Human Rights with Public Health, 
17 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 277, 294 (2003); John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Democracy 
and International Human Rights Law, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1739, 1752–55, 1761 (2009) 
(discussing the advantages of democratic process over international standards for states 
when protecting human rights and deterring self-dealing political elites). 
102 Cf. Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization 187–88 (2007) (detailing Gua-
temala’s struggle to force Gerber baby food producers to label the product despite U.S. 
threats to revoke Most Favored Nation status; the Guatemalan Supreme Court eventually 
found in favor of Gerber). Another classic example is the 1990s dispute at the WTO over the 
European Economic Community’s banana tariffs. See Zsolt K. Besskó, Going Bananas over EEC 
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perts—states’ roles are merely secondary.103 Primary actors are invisible 
in the daily lives, thinking, and changing cultures of peoples around the 
world, while secondary actors are visible in creating and enforcing pol-
icy agendas necessary to serve the primary actors’ interests. Secondary 
actors sometimes advance these agendas in the name of democracy and 
human rights,104 and sometimes in the name of countries’ economic 
interests.105 States, as secondary actors, participate in economic relations 
with other states in two ways: direct government-to-government relations 
through bilateral treaties, and indirect government-to-government rela-
tions through multilateral economic organizations.106 States have coor-
                                                                                                                      
 
Preferences?: A Look at the Banana Trade War and the WTO’s Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 28 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 265, 266, 270–71 (1996). Nu-
merous acts in recent years have illustrated instances where corporate entities has been inter-
twined with, and directly benefited from, exertions of state power at the highest levels. See 
Wolin, supra note 97, at 136; Besskó, supra, at 265; HalliburtonWatch.org, Halliburton An-
nounces 284 Percent Increase in War Profits, GlobalResearch (Aug. 4, 2005), http://www. 
globalresearch.ca/halliburton-announces-284-percent-increase-in-war- profits/801. 
103 See Mohamed Omar Gad, Impact of Multinational Enterprises on Multilateral Rule Mak-
ing: The Pharmaceutical Industry and the TRIPS Uruguay Round Negotiations, 9 Law & Bus. 
Rev. Am. 667, 686 (2003) (“Established by statute in 1974 to provide the U.S. President 
with advice on trade negotiations, the [Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations] was a 
committee of leading executive officers from major U.S. corporations with a stake in U.S. 
and international trade policy.”); Allison D. Garrett, The Corporation as Sovereign, 60 Me. L. 
Rev. 129, 148 (2008) (“For example, corporations engage in diplomacy, establish outposts 
in other nations, engage in trade negotiations, and often serve as proxies for their home 
country’s government.”). 
104 For example, in 2003 President George W. Bush, in his “freedom deficit” speech, 
said: 
[This] freedom deficit . . . has terrible consequences for the people in the Mid-
dle East and for the world. In many Middle Eastern countries, poverty is deep, 
and it is spreading. Women lack rights and are denied schooling. Whole socie-
ties remain stagnant while the world moves ahead . . . . Sixty years of Western 
nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East 
did nothing to make us safe, because in the long run, stability cannot be pur-
chased at the expense of liberty. 
Remarks on the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, 2 Pub. Pa-
pers 1468 (Nov. 6, 2003). 
105 The U.S. government has always made the national economic interest a top policy 
priority. See, e.g., Edward P. Djerejian, Assistant Sec’y of State for Near East Affairs, U.S. 
Economic Policy in the Middle East: Challenges and Opportunities, Address Before the 
Arab-American Business and Professional Association (Sept. 16, 1993), available at http:// 
www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/Vol%2016_2/Djerejian.pdf. For example, the Clinton admini-
stration tied political, diplomatic and security policies with the policy of promoting U.S. 
business, investment, and commercial interests abroad. See id. 
106 Cf. Osvaldo Sunkel, Transnational Capitalism and National Disintegration in Latin 
America, in The Political Economy of Law 282, 285–86 (Yash Ghai et al. eds., 1987). 
Sunkel addresses the structure of the system of international economic relations and states 
that this structure has turned into a superstructure of international relations, where trans-
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dinated with corporations by instituting new liberal economic reforms 
designed to facilitate market penetration.107 State functions are primar-
ily to institutionalize and rationalize the markets by protecting property 
rights (including intellectual property rights), liberalizing economic 
policies everywhere, and securing key inputs at lower cost to please the 
primary actors.108 The key inputs include labor, capital, technology, 
economic infrastructure, and social consensus.109 
 In addition, states engage in the external relations managerial 
function.110 Under this function, states organize and maintain their 
relations with foreign systems within and outside of domestic territories 
in order to expand or de-territorialize corporate capitalism.111 In this 
managerial role, states use a variety of instruments that they legitimately 
own or control: military power, aid, grants, commercial and financial 
sanctions, and appropriate forms of government control—all functions 
within the scope of the direct participation model.112 Under the indi-
rect participation model, states create multilateral treaties and organi-
zations (such as the IMF, World Bank, ICSID, WTO, etc.), and bring 
national sovereignty to an end, reinterpreting the sovereignty of all 
states by requiring political, monetary, and fiscal reforms to gain access 
to capital.113 As one scholar states, international trade and financial 
institutions are nothing but a policy tool in the name of free trade to 
serve “the interests of the strongest economic powers . . . not because 
trade really exists or could be achieved again, but because the progres-
                                                                                                                      
national corporations are the structure (primary actors or elements) and states are super-
structure (secondary actors or elements). See id. He explains further that the IMF, the 
GATT (now the WTO), and the World Bank are “partly a nostalgic hangover of economists 
who would like to recreate the nineteenth century ‘golden’ age of free trade . . . .” Id. at 
285. 
107 See id. at 285; see also Williamson, supra note 68, at 9–10. 
108 See Sunkel, supra note 106, at 283–85. 
109 Cf. id. at 288 (describing the major investments in transnational conglomerates as 
research, design, technology, capital, and international expansion via subsidiaries). 
110 See id. at 285. 
111 See id.; see also Frank J. Garcia, Three Takes on Global Justice, 31 U. La Verne L. Rev. 
323, 357–59 (2010). Professor Garcia analyzes the concept and process of globalization 
and suggests a global basis for global justice. See id. He first identifies three takes on global 
justice: global justice as the foreign policy of liberal states, globalization and global justice, 
and consent, oppression, and the nature of trade itself, and concludes that the current 
trade system tends to ignore the role of consent in economic exchange, risking facilitation 
of coercion and exploitation at the cost of intended social benefit. See id. 
112 Cf. Sunkel, supra note 106, at 285 (“The instruments of domination in bilateral re-
lationships are well known: tied loans, aid, preferential arrangements with regard to trans-
portation, foreign investment, tariffs, and so on.”). 
113 See id. at 285–86. 
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sive dismantling of protectionist practices (especially in underdevel-
oped countries) facilitates the opening up of new markets for the mul-
tinational corporation.”114 
B. Corporations: Super Hegemons? 
 Corporate capitalism plays a dominant role in today’s state and 
human affairs, and multinational corporations (MNCs) are ubiquitous 
in modern life.115 They are capable of dictating the decisions of states 
and directing the course of international law by either prompting states 
to implement and enforce treaties116 or influencing international soft 
law.117 Promotion of corporate interests by state governments creates 
an apparent conflict of values; democratic states are built around valu-
                                                                                                                      
114 See id. at 286. 
115 Cf. Sol Picciotto, Regulating Global Corporate Capitalism 108–10 (2011) 
(“[T]he corporation is . . . a central institutional form mediating social relations of power 
. . . . [The corporate form may be used] with virtually any combination of personal, family, 
institutional and governmental involvement.”); Multinational Enterprises, Int’l Lab. Org., 
http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/employment-promotion/multinational-enterprises/lang- 
en/index.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2013) (“Today, some 50,000 multinational enterprises and 
their 450,000 affiliates employ over 200 million people throughout the world. Their impact is 
felt in virtually every facet of industry, trade, services and business activities.”). 
116 Bilateral investment treaties, free trade agreements like NAFTA, ICSID’s implemen-
tation, and the influence of Western states in the World Bank and the IMF are all examples 
of ways states have acted to further the interests of private corporations. See Salacuse & 
Sullivan, supra note 63, at 71. 
117 On corporate responsibilities, two soft law instruments can be considered. First, the In-
ternational Labour Organization first adopted the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Con-
cerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy in 1977, and has since revised it in 2000 
and 2006. See Int’l Labour Office, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy 1 (4th ed. 2006), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---emp_ent/---multi/documents/pub- 
lication/wcms_094386.pdf. Second, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment has developed various sets of guidelines for multinational enterprises, including a 
corporation’s duties to follow the policies of its host country. See Org. for Econ. Co-
operation and Dev., OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 19 (2011), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf. These guidelines address hu-
man rights violation, bribery, pollution, and other effects of corporate practices. See id. at 19–
20. There are other international soft laws that are developed by corporate entities that are 
widely recognized by state apparatuses (in contrast to environmental and human rights soft 
laws); the International Chamber of Commerce’s Incoterms and UCPs are examples of such 
soft law regimes. See, e.g., Incoterms, Aquamarine Trans, http://www.aquamarine-trans.com/ 
en/incoterms.php (last visited Apr. 23, 2013). See generally Kevin T. Jackson, Global Corporate 
Governance: Soft Law and Reputational Accountability, 35 Brook. J. Int’l L. 41 (2010) (discuss-
ing corporations’ voluntary development of soft law as constraints on their own behavior). 
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ing human dignity and ingenuity while the only corporate value is the 
bottom line.118 
                                                                                                                     
 Increasing state reliance on MNCs comes at the cost of the states’ 
sovereignty, allowing corporate forces to become hegemons in their 
own right.119 First, state agencies outsource their major public func-
tions, including criminal investigations and arrest, protection of citizens 
and private properties, prison administration, migration and asylum, 
and food policies to corporations.120 Corporations now function like 
states and there are occasions when states act like corporations.121 Even 
conducting war, a major state function to protect sovereign interests, 
has been commercialized or corporatized.122 The power of the state is 
thus marginalized without the backing of powerful MNCs, replacing 
the responsibility of the state for its people with the responsibility of the 
MNC to its shareholders.123 
 Nevertheless, the notion of partnership between states and corpo-
rations has taken a path of legitimacy with the distinctive ideas of “pow-
er with” and “power over” suggesting that the “power over,” a vertical 
 
118 But see Slawotsky, supra note 97, at 85 (citing M. Cherif Bassiouni, Perspectives on In-
ternational Criminal Justice, 50 Va. J. Int’l L. 269, 282 (2010)) (“[S]tates’ goals of power and 
wealth are in frequent contrast with the human goals of justice and peace . . . .”) Human 
goals and states’ goals in a democracy are, in theory, one in the same. See id. (quoting Bas-
siouni, supra, at 282). Democratic government is, after all, by the people and for the peo-
ple. But the increasing dependence of states on MNCs logically conflates the goals of the 
two, effectively separating the state from the people that mandate it. 
119 Cf. Huntington, supra note 60, at 335 (comparing private transnational organiza-
tions, such as General Motors, with public governmental bodies, such as the United States 
Air Force). 
120 See Slawotsky, supra note 97, at 86–88. 
121 See Huntington, supra note 60, at 335; Slawotsky, supra note 97, at 86–88. Huntington 
compares General Motors (GM) to the United States Air Force (USAF) in terms of scale and 
global presence. See Huntington, supra note 60, at 335. He notes that in 1969, the USAF’s 
budget was twenty-seven billion dollars and GM’s sales were around twenty-four billion dol-
lars. Id. The USAF had fifty-four installations in twenty foreign countries employing 862,000 
people (including domestic employees), while GM had fifty-three plants or facilities in twen-
ty-five foreign countries employing 794,000 people. Id. The shared bureaucratic and hierar-
chical nature of these organizations makes them indistinguishable for Huntington’s analysis. 
See id. He notes that these “transnational” institutions with operations in multiple states none-
theless employ significant centralized control. See id. at 333. He maintains that multinational 
corporations are transnational in operations, multinational in personnel, but almost entirely 
national in control. See id. passim. 
122 Gathii, supra note 83, at 223–28 (2010); see Wolin, supra note 97, at 136 (“Corpo-
rate expansion extends to military functions, a province once jealously guarded as a state 
prerogative.”). 
123 See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 145 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 
No. 10-1491 (Apr. 17, 2013) (holding that corporations are not responsible under customary 
international law after allegedly facilitating governmental human rights violations). 
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system of power exercise, is implied to state practices, and the “power 
with,” a horizontal system of power exercise, is implied to corporate 
management as a problem-solving tool, and is a difficult concept to be 
applied in international law.124 Why should “power with” be so difficult 
to apply in international law, where the concept of sovereign equality 
promotes a horizontal international community? It will be difficult if we 
are committed to a hierarchical division among hegemon, quasi-
hegemon, and non-hegemon states. States share “power with” corpora-
tions to solve states’ economic, political, diplomatic, and security prob-
lems. In this process, corporations may enjoy sovereign immunity and 
profit from their expertise by opening up the market for state func-
tions.125 The second U.S.-Iraq war (2003) can be considered an effec-
tive state-corporate partnership (under the “power with” model), facili-
tating corporate interests by states126 and at the same time fulfilling 
states’ efficiency deficit (from supply of food to the military to the secu-
rity of government officials) with what amounts to merely another prof-
it venture for corporations.127 
 In this context, I would like to present the regime change in Libya 
as an example of a tacitly corporate-driven cause. In such situations, 
states act to advance democracy, implement Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P),128 and clear the way for corporations to control market and re-
sources, while corporations may help with security in post-conflict areas 
and begin their resource exploration projects.129 
                                                                                                                      
124 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Commentary on 2010 Grotius Lecture, 26 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 
1369, 1375 (2011). 
125 Cf. Jenny S. Lam, Accountability for Private Military Contractors Under the Alien Tort Statute, 
97 Calif. L. Rev. 1459, 1462 (2009) (“Until relatively recently, [private military contractors] 
enjoyed immunity from criminal prosecution in Iraq.”). 
126 See Paul Bignell, Secret Memos Expose Link Between Oil Firms and Invasion of Iraq, Indep. 
(London), Apr. 19, 2011, at 4. 
127 See Chad C. Carter, Halliburton Hears a Who? Political Question Doctrine Developments in 
the Global War on Terror and Their Impact on Government Contingency Contracting, 201 Mil. L. 
Rev. 86, 127 (2009); Andrew Finkelman, Suing the Hired Guns: An Analysis of Two Federal 
Defenses to Tort Lawsuits Against Military Contractors, 34 Brook. J. Int’l L. 395, 402 (2009); 
Naomi Klein, Bomb Before You Buy: The Economics of War, 2 Seattle J. for Soc. Just. 331, 
340 (2004); Lam, supra note 125, at 1459; David Jackson & Jason Grotto, Inside the World of 
War Profiteers: From Prostitutes to Super Bowl Tickets, a Federal Probe Reveals How Contractors in 
Iraq Cheated U.S., Chi. Trib., Feb. 21, 2008, at 1. 
128 See generally Responsibility to Protect, Office Special Adviser on Prevention of Geno-
cide, http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml (last visited Apr. 
18, 2013). 
129 Cf. Scott Shane, West Sees Libya as Ripe at Last for Business, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 2011, 
at A1 (reporting on dialogue between the interim post-revolutionary Libyan government 
and foreign corporations, including security firms). 
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V. Libya’s Gaddafi: A Suspect of Corporate Capitalism  
and an Example of Hegemony Shift? 
 Recent events in Libya show how states can act as conduits for cor-
porate capitalism. Actions against Libya and negotiations and compro-
mises in terms of international security threats and human rights, sta-
bility, and peace have been considered international law in action in 
Libya.130 The NATO-backed overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya’s 
head of state, was surprising considering he had agreed to all of the 
West’s security demands just a few years before and was hailed for his 
cooperation by U.S. President George W. Bush131 and UK Prime Minis-
ter Tony Blair.132 A comprehensive analysis of Gaddafi’s tempestuous 
relationship with Western corporate interests, however, reveals the pos-
sibility of sinister motivations and provides evidence of a shift in hege-
monic power from states to MNCs.133 
A. Gaddafi’s Checkered History of Cooperation and Its Consequences 
 After the explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988, the UN Security 
Council imposed economic sanctions against Libya at the behest of the 
                                                                                                                      
130 Cf. Jonte van Essen, De Facto Regimes in International Law, 28 Utrecht J. Int’l & Eur. 
L., no. 74, 2012 at 31, 31, 42, 46 (discussing the relation of international state-recognition 
doctrines to the Libyan interim government’s diplomacy). 
131 The UN lifted sanctions on Libya in September 2003, while U.S. economic sanctions 
ended on September 20, 2004. Global Message, White House (Sept. 20, 2004), http:// 
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040923.html; Security Coun-
cil Lifts Sanctions Against Libya Imposed After Lockerbie Bombing, UN News Centre (Sept. 12, 
2003), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?newsid=8225&cr=libya#.UV8AOKtVSv8. 
President Bush removed economic sanctions that were in place since 1986, due to Libya’s 
“concrete progress in dismantling its weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) and other missile 
capable programs. See Global Message, supra. The decision was made based on a nine-month 
investigation of Libya’s “transparent and verifiable” work “with international organizations, the 
United States and United Kingdom to eliminate its WMD . . . .” See id. “[T]he CIA and Britain’s 
MI6 maintained a close—even intimate—relationship with their Libyan counterparts dating as 
early as 2002, before the CIA had set up a ‘permanent’ mission in Libya (which, according to 
. . . documents, began in 2004).” See Abigail Hauslohner, How Libya Seems to Have Helped the CIA 
with Rendition of Terrorism Suspects, Time (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/ 
world/article/0,8599,2091653,00.html#ixzz1Wuedf4vb. “[W]estern intelligence agencies 
worked closely with the Libyans on the renditions of terrorism suspects to Libya for question-
ing between 2002 and 2004.” Id. 
132 See Blair Hails New Libyan Relations, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
uk_news/politics/3566545.stm (last updated Mar. 25, 2004). British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair visited Tripoli in March 2004 and hailed Gaddafi for the extraordinary step of re-
nouncing Libya’s WMD programs. See id. 
133 Cf. id. (“As Mr. Blair met Mr. Gaddafi, it was announced Anglo-Dutch oil giant Shell 
had signed a deal worth up to £550 [million] for gas exploration rights off the Libyan 
coast.”). 
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United States and the United Kingdom.134 The UN sanctions were lift-
ed after Libya handed over two suspects and agreed to pay compensa-
tion to the families of the explosion’s victims.135 UN sanctions against 
Libya were suspended during a boom in oil demand and price.136 The 
United States, however, continued its trade sanctions for supporting 
international terrorism and for attempting to develop weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD).137 
 In 2003, Libya declared that it was ready to disclose its WMD pro-
gram and agreed to WMD monitoring programs with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).138 In December 2003, Libya agreed to 
help make the Middle East and North Africa a WMD-free zone and to 
comply with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)139 to limit 
its missile activities. Libya also reaffirmed its commitments to the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,140 Convention on Chemi-
                                                                                                                      
134 See S.C. Res. 748, ¶¶ 4–5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31, 1992). 
135 See Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law—U.S./UK Ne-
gotiations with Libya Regarding Nonproliferation, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 169, 195–97 (2004) [here-
inafter Nonproliferation Negotiations]. 
136 Ronald Bruce St John, The Changing Libyan Economy: Causes and Consequences, 62 
Middle E. J. 75, 80 (2008). 
137 Nonproliferation Negotiations, supra note 135, at 195. 
138 See id. at 196. 
139 See Libyan Nuclear Weapons, GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 
wmd/world/libya/nuclear.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2013). 
 The [MTCR] is an informal and voluntary association of countries which 
share the goals of non-proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of 
delivering weapons of mass destruction . . . . The MTCR was originally estab-
lished in 1987 by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. Since that time, the number of MTCR partners has in-
creased to a total of thirty-four countries, all of which have equal standing 
within the Regime. 
 The MTCR was initiated partly in response to the increasing proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), i.e., nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons. The risk of proliferation of WMD is well recognized as a threat to 
international peace and security . . . . While concern has traditionally focus-
sed [sic] on state proliferators, after the tragic events of 11 September 2001, it 
became evident that more also has to be done to decrease the risk of WMD 
delivery systems falling into the hands of terrorist groups and individuals. . . . 
 The MTCR rests on adherence to common export policy guidelines (the 
MTCR Guidelines) applied to an integral common list of controlled items 
(the MTCR Equipment, Software and Technology Annex). 
The Missile Technology Control Regime, Missile Tech. Control Regime, http://www.mtcr.info/ 
english/index.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2013). 
140 Libyan Nuclear Weapons, supra note 139. 
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cal Weapons,141 Convention on Biological Weapons,142 the IAEA Safe-
guards Agreement,143 and the obligations in the Protocols to those con-
ventions.144 
 President Bush welcomed Libyan cooperation and promised Libya 
a return to a better relationship with the United States.145 Thereafter, 
U.S., UK, and IAEA experts reached an agreement to end Libya’s nu-
clear weapons program.146 Libya also ratified the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 2004.147 In 2006, the United States removed Lib-
ya from the list of states that sponsor terrorism.148 Libya transformed 
from Reagan’s mad-dog dictator of the Middle East to a great success 
story of U.S. unilateral sanction against a rogue state.149 
 Gaddafi “opened the Libyan economy to Western capital, carried 
out . . . economic reforms, and granted . . . investment deals to major 
oil companies of the West.”150 The Office of the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) and the Libyan General People’s Committee 
on Industry, Economy, and Trade signed the Trade and Investment 
Framework Agreement in May 2010.151 According to USTR, Libya was 
the sixty-ninth largest trade partner of the United States, with $2.6 bil-
lion in import/export trade in 2009.152 In 2007, the French sold anti-
                                                                                                                      
141 Libya Joins the Chemical Weapons Convention, Org. for Prohibition Chemical Weap-
ons ( Jan. 14, 2004), http://www.opcw.org/news/article/libya-joins-the-chemical-weapons- 
convention/. 
142 See Nuclear Threat Initiative, Libya Biological Chronology 1 (2011), avail-
able at http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/libya_biological.pdf?_=1321485045. 
143 See generally Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Implementation of the NPT Safeguards 
Agreement of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, IAEA Doc. GOV/2004/12 (Feb. 20, 
2004). 
144 Nonproliferation Negotiations, supra note 135, at 196 (quoting Letter Dated 19 Decem-
ber 2003 from the Permanent Rep. of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to theUnited Nations Ad-
dressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/1196 (Dec. 29, 2003)). 
145 Id. at 197 (quoting Remarks on the Decision by Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-
Qadhafi of Libya to Disclose and Dismantle Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, 39 
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1835, 1835–36 (Dec. 19, 2003)). 
146 See id. 
147 Id. 
148 Jonathan B. Schwartz, Dealing with a “Rogue State”: The Libya Precedent, 101 Am. J. 
Int’l L. 553, 553 (2007). 
149 See id. at 580; The President’s News Conference, 1 Pub. Papers 439 (Apr. 9, 1986), 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=37105. 
150 Ismael Hossein-Zadeh, Why Regime Change in Libya?, GlobalResearch ( June 20, 
2011), http://www.globalresearch.ca/why-regime-change-in-libya/. 
151 United States, Libya Sign Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, Office U.S. Trade 
Rep., http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/may/united-states-libya- 
sign-trade-and-investment-framewor (last visited Apr. 23, 2013). 
152 Id. 
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tank missiles and communications equipment to the Gaddafi regime.153 
UK Prime Minister Tony Blair reportedly lobbied Saif-al-Islam Gaddafi 
(son of Muammar Gaddafi) for Libya to invest $70 billion of oil pro-
ceeds with American investment bank JP Morgan.154 Mr. Blair also re-
portedly began work in January 2008 as a “two million pound-a-year” 
advisor to JP Morgan.155 
 After Libya’s diplomatic thaw, British Petroleum (BP) started a ma-
jor oil exploration venture and seismic test studies to drill forty-four bil-
lion barrels of Libyan oil reserves.156 BP signed a joint venture agree-
ment with Gaddafi’s Libya.157 At the dawn of this thaw in 2003, Libya’s 
foreign minister said that Libya hoped to attract oil investment by Amer-
ican companies.158 In 2003, the U.S. government also gave three oil cor-
porations—the Oasis Group formed by ConocoPhillips, Amerada Hess, 
and Marathon—permission to negotiate with Libyan authorities.159 
Other Western oil corporations such as Total of France, ENI of Italy, 
OMV of Austria, Woodside of Australia, Repsol of Spain, and Hellenic of 
Greece had already explored Libyan oil.160 After the waiver of UN and 
U.S. sanctions, Gaddafi was able to dampen opposition with the help of 
Libya’s economic and political partnership with the West.161 
B. National and Regional Development Under Gaddafi 
 Though orchestrated by a corrupt dictator, Libya under Gaddafi 
made rapid progress in improving the lives of Libyans.162 Gaddafi 
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played a leading role in promoting trade, development, and industriali-
zation projects on a local, national, and regional level, particularly in 
telecommunications.163 By gaining access to telecommunications tech-
nology developed and sold by Western countries, Libya was able to pro-
vide the region with low-cost connectivity.164 Forty-five African countries 
established the Regional African Satellite Communication Organiza-
tion (RASCOM) to have their own satellite and communications system 
and avoid a $500 million annual fee to the European system.165 Begin-
ning in the early 1990s, African countries asked the IMF and the World 
Bank to fund RASCOM.166 The IMF and the World Bank could not 
make any decisions for over a decade.167 Africa got its first satellite and 
communications system in 2007 when Gaddafi offered $300 million, 
the African Development Bank offered $50 million, and the West Afri-
can Development Bank offered $27 million.168 
 In another project, the Gaddafi regime invested billions to bring 
aquifer freshwater from southern Libya’s desert to the coastal regions 
where the populations are concentrated.169 The Man Made River is an 
acclaimed achievement that stands as a testimony to Gaddafi’s contri-
bution to Libya’s economic development.170 
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 With the improved quality of life, a hopeful development process, 
strong support and partnership with the West on the global war on ter-
ror, and expanding globalization in Libya, NATO support of a violent 
regime change seemed impractical. Four major factors may be identi-
fied that likely contributed to Gaddafi’s overthrow: 
1. Resource nationalization initiatives by Gaddafi in 2006: 
Gaddafi, focused on Libya’s forty-four billion-barrel oil re-
serve, began to implement a program of resource national-
ism in 2006, declaring that Libyans must take their profit 
share of oil resources controlled by foreigners.171 This pro-
gram showed Gaddafi again as an unreliable partner with 
corporate capitalism. The resource nationalization was not 
a new venture for Libya. When Libya became independent 
in 1951, the country was poor and underdeveloped. When 
large oil deposits were discovered in 1959, Libya decided to 
bring Western oil companies to explore Libya’s oil deposits, 
letting them earn substantial profit from the investments. 
In the 1970s, Libya nationalized the interests and properties 
of Western oil companies.172 
2. Investment diversification from Western corporations to 
BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) nations: Gaddafi 
also made extensive trade investment deals with BRIC 
powerhouse trading countries.173 
3. Gaddafi refused to join the United States Africa Command 
(AFRICOM).174 Some forty-nine countries signed on to the 
United States Military Charter for Africa.175 
4. Gaddafi neglected eastern Libya, where the population suf-
fered from discrimination and oppression.176 Benghazi was 
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more influenced by the Arab Spring in Egypt than other 
parts of Libya, in part because of its geographic location. 
As a result, oppressed people from eastern Libya (Ben-
ghazi) sought regime change.177 
 Despite the dictator’s efforts and some achievements toward mak-
ing Libyans’ lives comfortable, Gaddafi failed to demonstrate that he 
was a reliable partner with Western MNCs due to a pattern of obtaining 
capital from powerful Western corporations and then nationalizing that 
capital.178 The uprising in Libya against Gaddafi immediately received 
huge support from corporate capitalism, which hoped to maintain lu-
crative oil operations.179 Internal conflict in Libya created an atmos-
phere ripe for gross violation of human rights, challenges to dictator-
ship, and demands for democracy and civil rights, and coincided with 
corporate interests.180 These conditions triggered the involvement of 
the UN Security Council, which passed Resolution 1973 to protect civil-
ians from Gaddafi’s military, and ended with direct support to rebels 
with arms and money from NATO members.181 
 The rebels’ transitional government immediately declared its in-
tent to honor all oil contracts with corporations whose countries sup-
ported regime change and post-regime political stability.182 Sovereign 
states, the UN and its agencies, and international law scholars all 
rushed to determine international law as it applied to the Libyan tur-
moil in the areas of human rights, war conduct, democracy, genocide, 
humanitarian intervention, and the R2P initiative. This approach is all 
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too typical of the application of international law, adding insight into 
the question of whose interests are served by international law. Did Lib-
yans achieve what they intended to achieve? Or is this yet another addi-
tion in the world of events in which peoples (Libyans’) freedom aspira-
tions are trapped between corporate interests, success interests of in-
ternational organizations, international legal process, and states that 
initiated the regime change action in the name of human rights and 
democracy? If this is a success story of international law of human 
rights and democracy, what other countries are next in line—Bahrain, 
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and other non-democratic countries? 
Conclusion 
 Globalization has allowed corporate capitalism to achieve several 
goals: economic globalization; social, political, and legal value globaliza-
tion; creation of conflicts within states; and giving globalized effect to 
those internal conflicts. While undermining the real aspirations of the 
people involved in such conflict and crushing people’s expectations of 
freedom, development, and independence, corporate capitalism has 
converted globalization into a profit-making venture. All states— he-
gemon, quasi-hegemon, and non-hegemon—have begun to behave as 
agents of corporate capitalism. This is not to say that we should ignore 
the importance of corporations and positive effects of globalization with 
regard to the free and open flow of information, access to technology in 
most corners of world, and contributions to social and economic devel-
opment that corporate trade and investment activities and government 
policies have brought throughout the world. However, it is important to 
realize that corporations’ trade and investment activities and govern-
ments’ policies are beneficial only insofar as they are tools to advance 
human conditions, and should be resisted when they defeat that pur-
pose. 
 We are now in a new world order of hegemony shift from states to 
corporate capitalism. In this new world order, states are functioning as 
a conduit for corporate capitalism. The theory of global governance 
has been based on market and technology, particularly since the 1990s. 
Due to corporate capitalism-induced, market-driven globalization, we 
are beginning to enter an era of post-human society with a decline or 
an absence of aspirational and emotional human elements. States have 
become soft power and corporate capitalism has become hard power in 
the system of international law and order. The notion of peace and the 
conduct of war have become the primary business of corporations 
while states facilitate and sacrifice their resources and citizens for the 
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interests of corporate capitalism. Corporate capitalism now dictates 
when and where war or conflicts over resources are to be declared or 
manufactured. Corporate capitalism decides how free markets should 
be promoted through the IMF, World Bank, WTO, and direct state-to-
state bilateral agreements. States and civil societies are submitting their 
sovereign authority and political will to the greater good of suprana-
tional norms of globalization favorable to corporate capitalism. States 
will have responsibility toward only those people who are left by the 
process of globalization—globalization refugees. Market-friendly hu-
man rights, humanitarian assistance, the doctrine of R2P, systems of 
democracy, peace and security, and market-friendly think tanks and 
scholars will be (indeed, are being) realized—overall, an Aristotelian 
oligarchy on a global scale. 
 At the same time, this corporate capitalism-centric hegemonic in-
ternational law and globalization brings global disorder—global finan-
cial meltdown, global Occupy Wall Street movements, and possible ex-
acerbation of terrorism—and a desired illusion among hegemon, quasi-
hegemon, and non-hegemon states that they still possess sovereign 
power while basically hosting a service to corporate capitalism and in-
viting class warfare, even within stable societies. 
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